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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Am. Rivers v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 274 F. Supp. 2d 62
(D.D.C. 2003) (ordering the Army Corps of Engineers to comply with
a previous court order, or show cause why the court should not hold it
in contempt for failure to do so).
American Rivers filed a motion in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for an order requiring the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to show cause why the court
should not hold it in.
contempt and sanction it for disobeying a prior
The court previously enjoined the Corps from
court order.
implementing its Annual Operating Plan ("AOP") for the Main Stem
System of reservoirs on the Missouri River in a manner that would
adversely impact three species protected by the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA"). The court's injunction contradicted an earlier injunction
the Federal District Court for Nebraska ("Nebraska court") issued
preventing the Corps from releasing flows below a certain level for
navigation purposes. The Corps asserted, in defense, that the earlier
injunction rendered adherence to the later injunction impossible.
The court granted American Rivers' motion, finding that the earlier
injunction must be specific to the AOP effective at that time, and that,
in any case, the Corps could not claim that it was impossible to obey
one order where it merely chose, instead, to obey the other.
The Corps operated the Main Stem System of reservoirs on the
Missouri River. In May 2002, the Nebraska court ordered the Corps to
maintain minimum flows of 26,000 cubic feet of water per second
("cfs") on the river to support navigation. In June 2003, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the order. On July 12, 2003, the court
granted American Rivers' motion for a contrary injunction, ordering
the Corps to maintain maximum flows of 25,000 cfs for the latter half
of August. The Corps issued a press release stating that it would
maintain flows at the minimum of 26,000 cfs, and continued to do so.
American Rivers filed a motion for an order to show cause why the
court should not hold the Corps in contempt and levy sanctions
against it for disobeying its July 12 order.
In defense, the Corps argued that the Nebraska court's order of
2002 rendered adherence to the court's July 12 order impossible, since
the two orders were contradictory. In rejecting the Corps' argument,
the court found that the Nebraska court could not have intended that
its 2002 order apply to AOPs other than the one in effect at the time,
since such an order would preclude future operations not in
compliance with it. The court therefore found that the two orders
referred to different AOPs and were not in conflict. The court further
found that the Corps had chosen to obey the earlier order over the
later, and that the possibility presented by such a choice contradicted
the defense of impossibility.
Alternatively, the Corps argued that it was not subject to civil fines,
since it had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court held,
however, that the defense of sovereign immunity was inapplicable to
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coercive, rather than compensatory fines. Since American Rivers
sought coercive fines, the Corps was not immune.
The court entered an order for the Corps to show cause why it
should not find it in contempt and impose sanctions for the Corps'
refusal to obey the July 12 order. It also made a finding of civil
contempt conditional on continued refusal to comply with the July 12
order. It ordered further that continued refusal, past the deadline of
July 25, 2003, would result in a fine of $500,000 per day of noncompliance.
Owen Walker

Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Conm'rs of Calvert County,
301 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D. Md. 2004) (dismissing water cooperative's
federal claims that it had a right to provide water to new development
on summary judgment, and holding new development was not within
water company's franchise area).
Chesapeake Ranch Water Company ("Chesapeake") sued the
Calvert County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), seeking a
permanent injunction and Writ of Mandamus that it had rights to
supply water to a developing commercial park. Chesapeake sought to
provide water to a new commercial development across the street from
Chesapeake alleged the Board's denial of
the water company.
Chesapeake's right to provide water to the new commercial
development violated the Rural Development Act ("RDA") and several
Maryland statutes, and that Chesapeake had rights to provide water to
the new development because the development was within the water
company's franchise area.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Maryland initially addressed Chesapeake's federal claims under the
RDA. First, because the area in controversy was outside Chesapeake's
service territory and within the County's borders, the court held
Chesapeake failed to show the Board's action was a municipal
incursion on Chesapeake's franchise area under the RDA. Second, the
court held Chesapeake failed to satisfy the requirement under the
RDA that it show it previously made service available in the disputed
area. Specifically, the court rejected Chesapeake's argument that its
location across the street from the new development constituted
sufficient evidence that it could provide water to the development.
The court reasoned that Chesapeake must also prove it could provide
water under its permit, and that the permit limited authority to
specific subdivisions. Thus, the court dismissed Chesapeake's federal
claims as a matter of law.
The court then dismissed Chesapeake's remaining state law claim
under the Maryland statutes without prejudice. Specifically, the court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "needless
questions of state law" in light of the court's disposition of the federal

